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I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 1 (hereinafter Act or FCMA) provided the United
States with the authority to regulate the vast fishery
resources that are found within 299 miles of its coast. This
so-called ·299-mile law·, in effect, gave the United States the
, right to say who may catch the resources, in what areas, and in
what quantities. The Act established a Fishery Conservation
Zone (FCZ) 2 extending from the seaward boundary of the
Territorial Sea to 299 nautical miles from shore within which
the U.S. would assume exclusive fishery management authority.3
The Act provided a framework for the U.s. fishing industry
to rebuild itself and expand through the development of our
fisheries resources. The United States made a national
commitment to revitalize its commercial fisheries through a
system which includes preferential fishing rights for U.s.
fishermen and protection from the advanced and efficient
fishing fleets of foreign nations. However, even with the
benefits of the FCMA the domestic industries soon came to
realize that extended jurisdiction did not solve all fishery
problems. Competition with foreign fleets for fishery
resources still prevailed in some fisheries. Because of
inefficient operations, under investment in some fisheries and
overinvestment in others, and lack of technological equipment,
the small and highly fragmented commercial fish industry has
failed to respond tp the challenge of the system.
The U.S., once a leader among fishing nations, has now
fallen to fourth place in landings,4 which have not increased
at the same rate as fish consumption. This reduction in the
ability of the industry to compete in the world fishery market
in the face of a growing demand for fishery products is
evidenced by the relations of imports and domestic landings to
total U.S. supply. Imports have represented a steadily higher
margin of supplies of edible seafood products. In 1982,
imports were 4.7 billion pounds (round-weight), constituting
58.7% of total U.S. supply of edible fishery products. 5 Even
though industrial production is constantly being upgraded, and
worldwide catches are being landed at an increasing rate, the
failure of the industry to keep pace with the new development
is an anomaly. 6
On a national level the picture is a little brighter. The
U.S. commercial fishing industry is estimated to contribute
$7.5 billion to the GNP.7 It accounts for full-time employment
of roughly 279,999 with an additional 39,999 during pea~
seasons. In most regions off the coast of the U.s. there has
been sustained growth in the fisheries industry since 1973.
The fastest growing fishing region is Alaska, with the South
Atlantic not far behind.
Growth rates for all regions are as follows: 8
Region
New England
Mid-Atlantic
Chesapeake region
South Atlantic
Gulf
California
Northwest
Alaska
% Growth since 1973
31
-49
13
76
49
4
45
93
These growth rates indicate that the FCMA has helped the
industry expand, but whether the industry can develop to fully
utilize and process all the resources within our waters to the
exclusion of all foreign fleets is unpredictable at this point.
The preferential rights given to u.S. fishermen to harvest
available resources have led to the elimination of large
numbers of the foreign fishing vessels that were overexploiting
many fishery stocks. This loss of access to supplies alarmed
nations, e.g. Japan and the Soviet Union, which depend on
seafood as a major source of protein requirements. 9 Fish also
serves as a major export for many countries that fish within
the FCZ, such as Japan and Korea.l O In order to gain an
alternative but more definite access to supplies, foreign
nations, notably Japan, began investing in various segments of
the U.S. industry.Il In line with the increase in foreign
investment, news came out in August 1976 that Bellingham Cold
Storage of Seattle, Washington, was entering into a joint
business venture with the Soviet Union for the purpose of
harvesting and processing fish. The venture triggered
immediate speculation in the Pacific Northwest that this form
of business arrangement might become an Rescape hatch R through
which foreign states could sidestep the restrictions on foreign
fishing the FCz~2 Since that time, the number of joint
ventures 13 has increased and so has the controversy regarding
these adaptive arrangements. Critics charged that these
arrangements were Rloopholes R in the FCMA which should be
eliminated. 14
This paper will examine the development of joint ventures
under the FCKA, the legislative and regulatory measures
designed to control these ventures and the procedures for
establishing a joint venture. More recent developments in
joint venture policy will be examined, including the
controversy over squid joint ventures on the East Coast, to
determine what the objectives are and what current policy is
regarding joint ventures. The debate between harvesters and
processors will be put forth as a way of summarizing the costs
and benefits of joint ventures to the industry as a whole.
Finally, recommendations on policy will be suggested and
2
conclusions drawn concerning the future viability of joint
ventures in overall fisheries management.
II. OVERVIEW OF JOINT VENTURE DEVELOPMENT
The clear policy of the u.s. in enacting the FCMA was to
develop American fishing capacity to harvest the entire optimum
yield and eventually exclude foreign fishermen entirely. 15
Under the FCMA, foreign fishing in the FCZ is prohibited unless
it is authorized by an existing fishery treaty or agreement, or
by a "governing international fishery agreement" negotiated
pursuant to the Act.16 Each fishing vessel of a nation
authorized to fish within the FCZ must have a valid permit and
must fish in accordance with the conditions and restrictions of
that permit. 17
The FCMA provided that processing and support vessels are
"fishing vessels" for purposes of the Act 18, and therefore
SUbject to the permitting system applicable to all foreign
fishing vessels 19, and that "fishing" as defined in the Act
included any support activities or operations at sea relating
to the catching, taking, or harvesting of fish. 20 The FCMA,
however, did not deal with the possibility of foreign
processing vessels conducting joint operations with U.s.
fishermen. "Foreign fishing" is defined as "fishing by a
vessel other than a vessel of the United States". 21 A "vessel
of the United States" is one that is "registered under the laws
of any state [of the United States]" or is "documented under
the laws of the United States".22
Until recently, the distinction between domestic and
foreign fishing enterprises was a relatively uncomplicated
issue. In most cases, a commercial entity engaged in fishing
was prOVided the preference or was subject to the restrictions
that attached to the flag of its vessels. 23 No inquiry
generally was made as to nationality of the vessel's owner or
crew. Some ambiguity in the meaning of these two phrases
resulted in allowing foreign fishing interests access to
fishery resources by owning or operating a U.s. vessel since
the definition of a "vessel of the United States" did not
absolutely eliminate foreign fishing interests. The issue of
foreign ownership in U.S. vessels was a grave concern in House
hearings after implementation of the FCMA.24
When joint ventures were first proposed tremendous
controversy arose co~~erning these activities and a difficult
policy issue emerged. Congressional hearings were immediately
held.~6 The purpose of these hearings was to determine whether
or not joint ventures raised questions about the enforcement of
the 200-mile law and to determine what steps, if any, were
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necessary to make certain that the spirit as well as the letter
of the law was maintained.27
Key questions were whether these arrangements would allow
foreign states to harvest fish that were not surplus to U.S.
needs as outlined in the FCMA; whether the arrangements would
allow foreign states to avoid the f~~s imposed on foreign
fleets to help manage our fisheries ; and whether joint
ventures would permit foreign states to roam at will throughout
the 200-mile zone. 29
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) received two
applications for foreign processing vessels to receive U.S.
harvested fish in 1977. NMFS did not immediately act upon the
applications because it felt a need to consider and evaluate
alternatives and to develop a policy governing such ventures.30
The applications were received from two fishing companies who
proposed to use foreign processing and transport vessels to
purchase, yrocess, and transport fish caught by U.S.
fishermen. 3
The two major proposals concerned the foreign purchase of
Gulf of Alaska (GOA) pollock from Alaskan fishermen and Pacific
hake from West Coast fishermen. Other operations for Bering
Sea herring, Alaska salmon, black cod, and Atlantic squid were
being considered by foreign companies in 1977.32
The reason behind the formation of joint ventures is
obvious. Foreigners looked for sources of supply, and domestic
businessmen recognized the inefficiency involved with large-
scale onshore processing of pollock. 33 They saw a joint
venture operation as a means of recognizing immediate gains
from exploitation without delays of the normal investment
process. The size of the capital outlay was smaller. The
costs of operation were less because of cheaper foreign labor
on processing ships and the inefficiency of at-sea processing
for pollock. 34 It was a more risk-free alternative to gain
expertise in the high volume, low value type of fishing
operation which the pollock fishing represented and with which
the U.S. had little previous experience. 35 But for NMFS,
granting the permits posed special problems. Granting such
permits could have: (1) resulted in exceeding the optimum yield
(OY) since regulations in place contemplated harvest levels
without the product level provided by joint ventures; (2)
decreased the catch available to domestic processors; and (3)
expanded market opportunities for U.S. fishermen. 36 Because of
potential far-reaching effects, the joint venture proposals
generated considerable controversy and led to extensive pUblic
hearings.
Opponents of joint ventures argued that onshore processors
could not compete with foreign processing vessels that were not
subject to U.S. wage, safety and health requirements 37, an
4
argument still being promoted today. These onshore processors
also demanded clarification of FCMA and its allowances, arguing
that the FCMA was passed to promote development of the entire
fishing industry, not just the fishermen, and that this per-
ceived R100pho1e R38 should be effectively closed in order that
new onshore processing capacity would not be hindered. 39
Proponents of joint ventures countered that joint ventures
were proposed only for species for which there was little or no
u.s. processing capacity, that the joint ventures would not
only transfer technology necessary to open up new fisheries
fors u.s. fishermen by providing an immediate market 40, but
would also help the development of U.S. fisheries for under-
utilized species. 41 Some proponents were convinced that joint
ventures would actually aid the development of harvesting and
processing sectors. It was felt that by giving u.s. fishermen
experience in new fisheries and by supplying an adequate supply
of under-utilized species to processors once expertise was
developed, then new investment and expansion could bejustified. 42
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
Because of the importance and long-range consequences of
granting these permits, an advance "Notice of Proposed
RUlemaking R was published in the Federal Register on June 17,
1977, giving notice to hold public hearings on the joint
ventures. 43 The Councils were invited to join NMFS in these
hearings. On July 13, 1977, NMFS issued proposed rules
concerning new procedures to provide for modification of
existing foreign fishing permits, if they did not specifically
prohibit foreign vessels from purchasing u.s. fish harvested in
the FCZ.44 NMFS held a series of eighteen pUblic field
hearings in July and August of 1977 to receive comments
generally on Rjoint fisheries ventures R and more specifically
on "selling at sea with respect to under-utilized species under
certain conditions."45 Results of the hearings were considered
by the Marine Fisheries Advisory Committee (MAFAC) at a pUblic
meeting on October 5, 1977. The MAFAC on October 6, 1977, gave
NMFS a series of recommendations on the issue, including a call
for case-by-case consideration of joint venture proposals. 46
The Committee recognized that "joint ventures may be a vehicle
to be utilized by U.S. harvesters and processors to achieve the
objectives of the Act" and that the U.S. trade policy Ris
.relevant to whether joint ventures should be al1owed R.47
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
then issued final regulations Rto govern fishing activities of
foreign fishing vessels fishing within the U.S. Fishery
Conservation Zone (FCZ) during 1978."48 The new regUlations
purported to make it clear that foreign fishing vessels
providing support for vessels of the U.S. in the form of at-sea
processing would have to be authorized by permit.
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Following the 1977 public hearings, consideration by
MAFAC, and extensive NOAA review or these alternatives, an
interim policy statement was proposed and pUblished in the
Federal Register to govern consideration of applications for
permits by foreign vessels seeking to purchase of receive fish
from U.S. vessels in the FCZ.49 This policy provided that
foreign joint ventures applications be approved only when the
capability and intent of the U.S. fishing industry to harvest
fish exceeded the capability and intent of the U.S. processors
to process the fish. NOAA received comments to the proposed
policy which questioned the legal authority of NOAA to base a
permitting system on purposes other than conservation and
management in the Act. The comments also suggested the policy
was contrary to the purposes of the FCMA because it inhibited
the development of new fisheries for under-utilized species by
restricting markets. 50
Analysis of the comments received, and further review of
the legal and policy issues involved, led NOAA to conclude that
such a "preference" policy lacked legislative authority because
the policy was based on factors not directly related to
conservation and management of the resource and requirements of
the FCMA. 51
On April 26, 1978, the Department of Commerce acknowledged
the shortcoming of its authority under the FCMA. James Walsh,
Deputy Administrator of NOAA, announced "the government will
have no choice but to issue long-delayed permits to two foreign
factory vessels that want to come within the 200-mi1e limit and
buy U.S. fish from U.S. fishing vessels". 52 Accordingly, on
May 12, 1978, NOAA pUblished in the Federal Register a policy
statement that permitted receipt of U.S. fish by foreign
vessels if the application and activities of the foreign
vessels met the conservation and management requirements of the
FCMA and other applicable 1aw. 53
Two civil actions were filed to challenge the new policy
announced by NOAA with respect to foreign fish processing
vessels in the FCZ. One such case, Tom Lazzio Fish Co. v.
Kreps, was filed in the District Court in Washington, D.C. by a
variety of West Coast fishing companies 54, while the other case
Pacific Seafood Processors Association v. Kreps, was commenced
in the District Court in Seattle by a different group of
firms. 55 Both actions challenged the NOAA policy statement
under which fish caught by U.S. vessels, but processed by
foreign vessels, were treated as part of the U.S. share rather
than deducted from the Total Allowable Level of Foreign Fishing
(TALFF).56 The two actions also asserted that the Secretary
should provide a preference to U.S. fish processors, and that
the policy statement was issued in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act. 57 In June 1978, U.S.
Magistrate Weinberg in Seattle denied an application by
plaintiffs in the Pacific Seafood Processor's case for a
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temporary restraining order enJolnlng the Secretary from taking
action on the foreign vessels permits. 58 These cases were
essentially mooted in August 1978 when the Congress passed
amendments to the FCMA 59, which established specific
procedures for considering joint venture applications.
NOAA'S radical policy reversal apparently was intended to
provoke and arouse opponents of joint ventures, and they, in a
surprisingly strong organized effort, pushed Congress to
respond legislatively. Congress acted immediately to amend the
FCMA by providing NOAA with the authority to regulate ventures
and by creating a domestic processor preference scheme similar
to the priority given to u.s. fishermen in the FCZ.60
A. Joint Venture Amendments of 1978.
On August 28, 1978, the Joint Venture Amendments of Pub.
L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519, were enacted. The law amended
certain sections of the FCMA to give processors an advantage
similar to the advantages given harvesters with the original
FCMA. 61 Protection was extended to shoreside processors by
giving them a preferential right to establish what portion of
the u.S. catch they would have the capacity to utilize. By
the amendments, the FCMA was extended to ensure that all
sectors of the industry would have the opportunity to benefit
from extended jurisdiction. 62 Furthermore, a more favorable
economic atmosphere was created within which domestic
processors could compete and expand their utilization of under-
utilized resources with assurances that they would have first
priority to the u.S. catch.
It is obvious that the fishermen were not well organized
at the time these amendments were being considered or they
would have fought strongly against this intrusion into their
freedom. For these amendments considerably restricted any
promotion of new markets strictly for the fishermen's sake by
mandating equal promotion for all segments of the industry. In
effect, the u.S. fishermen were required to downplay their new
initiatives just to give an advantage to shoreside processors.
The amendments created a domestic processor preference
scheme by establishing a three-tiered priority system for
fishing operations in the FCZ by governing the issuance of
permits for foreign processing vesselsfi3 First priority was
given to the u.S. fishing industry for fish harvested and
processed domestically. Second priority was given to opera-
tions involving over-the-side sales of domestically harvested
fish to foreign processing vessels. The lowest priority was
given to foreign fishermen involved in a directed fishery with
TALFF allocations. 64
7
The effect of the amendment guidelines was that permits
for foreign processing vessels could only be issued for that
part of the Optimum Yield (OY) which was not utilized by u.s.
processors. 65 The Regional Fishery Management Councils were
required to include an assessment of the "capacity and extent
to which United States processors will process United States
harvested fish on an annual basis" in preparing Fishery
Management Plans for affected species. 66
The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee found that
without appropriate legal authority to regulate these joint
ventures between foreign processing vessels and U.s. fishermen,
the U.s. processing industry would face an uncertain future and
would have to compete for all species within our FCZ with a
foreign fleet operating, on a significantly different cost
basis. 67 One potential butcome of this situation would be
significant damage to the domestic processing industry.
Congress thought the amendments would bring increased job
security to workers in U.s. processing plants by assuring a
constant supply of fish. 68 However, a problem remained in
that the processor preference would not ensure a lessening of
competition from the fish importers that had dominated the u.s.
fish market since World War II. 69 Because of the
Administration's commitment to free trade policies, there was
no provision regarding protection from imports.
One concern that soon arose after enactment of the joint
venture amendments was the fear that foreign countries were
investing in the u.s. processing industry as another means of
circumventing the Act. Congress called on the General
Accounting Office to study all aspects of foreign investment in
the u.s. fishing industry. 70 GAO's study dealt with the
extent and nature of foreign investment and the impact of such
investment 7 whether if the concern among the industry and
public officials that u.s. owners and managers were losing
control of the industry was valid7 and whether the fear that
foreign investors were unduly influencing u.s. production,
marketing, pricing, and fisheries development, was jus-
tified. 71
GAO identified 61 U.S. seafood processing firms with
foreign ownership. The majority of these firms were in
Washington, Alaska and Oregon. The rest of the firms were
located in six East Coast states. GAO also identified 27 u.s.
seafood processing firms located in Washington, Alaska and on
the East Coast which had loans from foreign sources. Sixteen
of these firms also had foreign ownership. 72 GAO made the
conclusion that federal and state government information on the
extent of foreign investment in seafood processors was
lacking 73 because most of the states covered by GAO's review
did not require firms doing business in their states to
disclose foreign investment. 74 GAO found no consensus on the
effects of foreign investment on seafood processors except that
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some industry and pUblic officials believed that foreign
investors could manipulate the industry while others believed
that foreign investment supplied necessary and beneficial funds
to u.s. seafood processors. 75
While concerns about the negative impact of foreign
investment raged on, other problems developed concerning the
implementation of the legislation. The joint venture
amendments made it clear that it was the intent of Congress to
encourage the development of under-utilized fisheries by the
entire u.s. fishing industry, both harvesters and processors.
All foreign vessels were to have a permit authorizing the
receipt of any fish. u.s. fishermen were prohibited from
making any transfer without such a permit. 76
On October 29, 1978, NOAA proposed amendments to 59 C.F.R.
692, "Guidelines for the Development of Fishery Management
Plans" to implement the provisions of Pub. L. No. 95-354.77 At
the same time, NOAA published in the Federal Register
preliminary determinations of the consistency of existing 1978
"Joint Venture" permits with L. No. 95-354. 78 Comments on
the proposed amendments and the preliminary determinations were
then reviewed. The information requirements that Regional
Councils were to assess as contained in the amended 59 C.F.R.
692.3, included: contracts to purchase fish, the ability and
intent of processors to process a particular species,
geographical proximity of harvest areas, recent history of
processor activity, seasonal schedules, availability of labor
force, processing machinery, etc. 79
In determining capacities and allocations, the Regional
Councils determine Domestic Annual Harvesting (DAH) after the
OY is fixed. The difference between OY and DAH may be
allocated as TALFF to foreign fleets by the Department of
State. 80 The Domestic Annual Processing (DAP) must then be
determined in order to find if any of the DAH will be available
for Joint Venture Processing (JVP). 81 A potential problem
arises with respect to redistributions of allocations if the
DAP falls below the amount initially declared for a certain
fishery. At first glance it seems reallocations would be made
in much the same fashion as reallocations of surplus stocks for
harvesting purposes. Since the JVP is calculated directly from
the DAH, any surplus of stocks remaining from inability of u.s.
processors to process would have to be allocated to joint
venture processors in order to sustain the DAH and provide a
market for u.s. fishermen. The three-tiered priority system of
the 1978 amendments would clearly support this inference since
joint ventures are given priority over foreign
harvesting/processing operations. 82 However, there are no
provisions for dealing with this situation in the Act, or in
the regulations. Since permits specify the amounts allowed for
foreign processing, there needs to be some provision for
amending the permits in light of reallocation of the DAP.
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There are also no provisions regulating the discretion of the
Secretary in making the reallocations - whether reallocations
are mandatory or not.
Some processors viewed the possibility of such a
reallocation to joint ventures as the final step in undermining
the domestic processor priority for under-utilized species 83
It was also suggested that if reallocations were made to
foreign fishermen as part of TALFF, rather than to joint
ventures, there would be more incentive for u.s. fishermen to
deliver to domestic processors. 84 For reasons stated above,
there would be no justification for reallocations to foreign
fishermen if any domestic harvesting capacity existed.
In order to give u.s. processors as much protection as
necessary, time and area restrictions could be placed on the
permits for foreign joint ventures in order to lessen the
impact on onshore processors and for conservation or management
purposes. 85 Although fostering more protection for u.s.
processors, they also could have the possibly inadvertant and
detrimental effect of limiting opportunities to u.s. fishermen
in developing fisheries for under-utilized species. These
restrictions would not encourage u.s. fishermen to enter an
under-utilized fishery in the first place in areas where joint
ventures were not allowed because of limited market
opportunities. 86 The DAB for under-utilized species had
previously been fixed by the domestic processing capacity
because these processors provided the only available markets,
so there was an initial difficulty in determining the effect on
DAB.
Proponents of joint ventures tried to promote the idea
that the DAB could be calculated by adding the DAP and the
potential amount of fish processed by joint ventures because
the joint ventures would provide an additional market for
domestically harvested fish. 87 But, as the processors
countered, this would create an automatic allocation for joint
ventures but would not take into account opportunities for
growth in processing capacity, or whether the new markets would
lure fishermen from other more valuable fisheries. There was
also concern as to whether any priority protection was actually
given to U.S. processors. The processors were just as extreme
in their approach, however: They wanted DAP to be defined as
the OY, thereby shutting out any joint venture activity.
On May 1, 1979, the New England Fish Co. (NEFCO) and
certain other u.s. fish processors and a fishermen's group
filed a civil suit in u.s. District Court in Washington, D.C.
challenging NOAA's interpretation and implementation of thejoint venture amendments to the FCMA.88 Plaintiffs alleged,
among other things, that the pUblic had not been given an
adequate opportunity to comment on certain applications for
foreign fishing vessels that would engage in joint ventures;
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that NMFS had failed to rely on U.S. processors' statements of
intent as determinative of how much fish they would process,
and that fish caught by U.S. harvesters and processed by
foreign fishing vessels in joint ventures should be counted
against the TALFF. The processors argued that determinations
of DAB should be based on an independent calculation of
processors' capacity, otherwise overestimates of DAH could
substantially injure the development of shore-based processors.
The plaintiffs sought to invalidate permits that had been
issued to Korean vessels for a joint venture off Alaska and to
prevent issuance of similar permits to certain USSR vessels.
NOAA'S answer to the complaint generally denied that the agency
had acted illegally in any way concerning the subject joint
venture permits and determinations, and Korea Marine Industries
Development Corporation (KMIDC) intervened in the case. 89 On
December 1979, a settlement was submitted for court approval.
In the proposed settlement agreement filed with the Court, NOAA
agreed to clarify procedures that allow the public to comment
on foreign joint venture applications before decisions are made
on them. NOAA also agreed to make available to the public an
explanation of how the agency determines its estimates of DAH,
DAP and JVP. 90 Confidential data used to determine the
estimates would not be made public. At the same time, NMFS
recognized that the amount and type of information necessary to
make the required determinations may vary with different
fisheries 91 thus leading the way for some discretionary
determinations in different fisheries that could not be
challenged in Court unless they were considered capricious and
arbitrary. 92
One more problem involved in determining processors'
capacity and intent were the prices these processors could
offer U.S. fishermen. A difficulty arising in this
determination was maintaining the processor priority in under-
utilized species where there was direct competition from joint
ventures. Even if shoreside processors could offer the same
prices as the foreign processors, it is likely the U.S. fisher-
men would choose to deliver to the foreign processors because
of savings on delivery time, cost of ice, fuel, and increased
fishing time. 93
The legislative history indicated that U.S. fishermen do
not have to fulfill the requirements of U.S. processors1 fish
may be delivered to processing vessels, and fishermen have the
right to refuse to deliver to processors if the fishermen are
unsatisfied with the terms offered by the processors.94 As one
commentator wrote:
In other words, for underutilized species, the
amendment establishes a processor priority for
fishery allocations, but in no way creates the same
type of captive market that exists for fully utilized
11
species, nor does it guarantee that anticipated
levels of fish will be delivered to United states
processors. When one also considers that most United
States fishermen have a certain amount of flexability
and are not restricted to one fishery, merely
limiting fishery allocations to joint ventures does
not necessarily benefit the onshore processor of
underutilized species1 fishermen may change to an
alternative fishery rather than resort to less
economically viable onshore markets. Given these
facts, it is difficult to ascertain whether
processors of under~5ilized species have been given
any priority at all.
Although price may not be a relevant consideration in
determining processors' capacity and intent, it often becomes a
determining factor in monitoring the requisite -intent- to
process since fishermen are not required to sell the U.s.
processors if they do not agree on price terms. In other
words, if processors intend to offer prices competitive with
joint ventures, then their intent is present and their
preferred capacity can be increased. But on the other hand, if
their price terms should later fall short of the terms offered
by the joint venture operation, this would signal a lessening
of intent to process the fish. 96
Critics of the amendments claim that the standards for
determining processor capacity were not properly developed, nor
are they being applied properly now. Thus there are gross
overestimates of DAP capacity in the FMPs for under-utilized
species, such as squid, causing fishermen to be hampered in
their ability to expand effort. This area is ripe for
litigation and it remains to be seen what will happen as more
fishermen become frustrated in their efforts.
Another criticism of the amendments is that they require
the Regional Councils and NMFS to predict what processors'
capacity will be 15 or 16 months ahead of the fishery.
Predictions must be made as to what fishermen will catch and
what processors will process. These predictions can end up
being very speculative. It is possible that Congress left the
language on defining intent and capacity purposely vague so
that the Secretary of Commerce could respond on a regional
basis to the needs of processors.
B. American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1989.
In 19891 Congress passed the American Fisheries PromotionAct (AFPA).~7 As a preliminary matter Congress changed the
name of the Act to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MFCMA) to honor Warren Magnuson, long-time
12
Senator from Washington and principal architect of the Act. 98
In enacting the AFPA, Congress primarily focused on legislative
action that could further stimulate and enhance the development
of the u.s. fishing industry. Congress had originally hoped
that the active pursuit of the underlying policies of the FCMA
- that is, the grant of priority access to U.S. fishermen to
fishery resources found of the coasts of the U.S. - would
result in the rapid replacement of foreign fishing efforts
within the u.s. FCZ by domestic fishermen. 99 According to a
House Committee report this hope had not been fully realized,
in large part because foreign nations had created tariff and
other trade barriers to the importation of u.s. harvested
fish. 100 These barriers helped perpetrate the lack of adequate
markets for u.s. fish products and acted as an artificial brake
upon the development of the u.s. fishing industry.
Specifically, the AFPA amended the criteria upon which the
Secretary of Commerce must rely in allocating the TALFF to
various countries to take into account whether and to what
extent, a nation requesting allocations imposes tariff or non-
tariff barriers on the importation of u.s. fish or fishery
products, whether the nation is cooperative with the u.s. in
advancing new opportunities for fisheries trade: or how the
nation contributes or helps foster the growth of a sound and
economic u.s. fishing industry. 101 Second, a number of
provisions were designed to accelerate the phase-out of foreign
fishing in the FCZ and the concurrent development of the u.s.
industry in those fisheries. The development of the u.s.
industry was to be aided by monies received as a result of
increased fees charged to those foreign fishermen who remain in
the FCZ. 102
The AFPA affected joint ventures in a number of ways.
First, the AFPA resolved the question of whether the Secretary
of Commerce could consider foreign trade barriers in approving
joint ventures. 103 This was an important consideration
because the trade barrier limitations could severely restrict
access to new markets for u.s. processed fish. Secondly, in
establishing the level of foreign fishing fees to be assessed,
the legislative history indicated that it was not Congress's
intent that foreign processing vessels purchasing u.s.-
harvested fish at sea be charged at the same rate as foreign
fish harvesting vessels, because "foreign processors
participating in these joint ventures are benefitting u.s.
fishermen, therefore, the foreign processing vessels should not
be required to assume the same financial obligations as foreign
fishing vessels and foreign processing vessels which are
servicing foreign fishing vessels." 104 Thirdly, it was feared
that the AFPA phase-out mechanism could have the effect of
harming foreign trade relations by stifling joint ventures,
plans for investment in processing plants, formation of new
markets, and technical assistance. It was felt that phase-out
was inconsistent with linking TALFF to gaining foreign market
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access. 105. Thus, by discriminating against world markets
already developed, the AFPA would be unsuccessful in promoting
the U.S. fishing industry. Actually, the opposite has come
true: By restricting access of foreign fleets, joint ventures
have been encouraged since many countries are dependent on fish
supply and they realize that access to supplies through joint
ventures is better than no access at all.
C. Internal Waters Amendment of 1982.
In 1981, a controversy arose when Bristol Bay Herring
Marketing Cooperative, a herring fishermen's association,
created a joint venture with the N. Pacific Longline-Gillnet
Association, a Japanese enterprise. The venture itself - the
Alaskan Herring Corporation - was to be restricted to
purchasing herring in Alaskan waters directly from fishermen
and unloading the catch into a freezer hold for transport to
processing facilities in Japan. However, an Alaskan state
regulation required primary processing of fishery resources to
take place in Alaska before allowing shipment to a foreign
nation. In other words, Alaskan processors had the first right
to catches from vessels making landings in the state. The
joint venture was in apparent defiance of this Alaskan law.
Bristol Bay filed suit in the District Court in Anchorage
seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the provision by the
Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Ronald
Skoog. lOG After a trial on the merits, a permanent injunction
was granted on the basis that the processing requirement
constituted an wunlawful burden under the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution w• l 07 After this decision, a
general fear spread that U.S. fishermen would seek foreign
buyers for other types of seafood. As a result of this
decision, states could not prohibit foreign processing vessels
from entering their internal waters. A state's internal waters
are located inside the baseline used for establishing the
three-mile territorial sea. lOa
The court in Bristol Bay noted that the state regulation
was essentially a measure of economic protection, held to be an
unconstitutional burden on interstate and foreign commerce, and
that establishment of such a system favoring domestic
processors required action only by the Federal government. l 09
This court action renewed concern as to whether or not
existing federal law, specifically the MFCMA, prohibited the
operation of foreign processing vessels in the internal waters
of any state. Sec. 397(2) (A) of the MFCMA prohibits foreign
vessels from engaging in wfishing Wwithin the boundaries of any
state. 110 The term wfishing Wis defined in the MFCMA to
include support activities when conducted Wat sea w• l l l As the
point of confusion, the term Wat sea w was formerly interpreted
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by NOAA as Rencompassing all oceanic waters extending outward
from the baseline of the territorial sea R • 112 Following this
interpretation, Rfishing R in state waters, as defined in the
MFCMA, would refer only to the territorial sea and not to the
internal waters of the state. Neither the act nor its
legislative history defines Rinternal waters R• 113 The court
in Bristol Bay never addressed this question of whether the
federal prohibition of Rat seaR processing was applicable. It
appeared therefore, that no extant federal law pertained to the
regulation of foreign processing vessels within the internal
waters of a state.
A subsequent suit was brought by interested Alaskan fish
processors seeking injunctive relief.114 These processors
argued that the MFCMA absolutely prohibited foreign processing
vessels from operating within a state's waters and that the
proposed herring sale was therefore illegal. The District
Court denied the request for relief holding that no such
private right of action existed under the MFCMA.
u.s. processor interests advised the Secretary of Commerce
of their view that foreign harvesting and processing activities
in state internal waters was absolutely prohibited by the
MFCMA. In this interpretation, Rat seaR was meant to apply to
those areas not on land. In contrast, U.S. fish harvesters
expressed concern that u.s. shore-side processing capacity was
often inadequate 7 that without the processing capacity provided
by foreign vessels, their ability to reach their harvesting
capacity would be severely restricted. 115
Since 1980, the problem of unrestricted operation of
foreign processing vessels in state internal waters has
expanded from Alaska to become a national concern. On the East
Coast, a Portuguese company tied a processing vessel up to a
dock in Fall River, Mass., and purchased codfish. After it
made its purchases, it began processing the fish once it got
outside the 3-mile territorial sea on its way back home. This
blantant operation enraged local processors, who turned to
Congress for the relief they felt they were owed.
Legislation was then introduced by Congressman Donald
Young (R-AK) in Congress to fill this gap in the regulation of
foreign processing vessels. The draft bill suggested a coastal
state would be allowed to offer the federal government a
management plan for foreigners within state waters. If the
plan were approved, the state would be able to manage its own
affairs7 otherwise, without a plan, the federal government
would have the right to control the operation of foreign
vessels in the state's waters. On June 1, 1982, the President
signed 5.2535 into public law to regulate foreign fish
processing vessels operating within state's internal
waters. 116 The purpose of the bill was to provide that no
foreign fishing vessel could process fish within the internal
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waters of a state unless the Governor of that state finds the
U.S. fish processors did not have the capacity and intent to
process all U.S. harvested fish from the fishery concerned. 117
The bill amended §306 (a) of the MFCMA by extending State
fisheries jurisdiction to ·(1) any pocket of waters that is
adjacent to the State and totally enclosed by lines delineating
the territorial sea of the United States ••• ·~18 The bill also
adopted the same test for determining whether foreign
processing vessels will be allowed to operate in State waters
that is used for allowing joint ventures in the FCZ.119
The amendment permits a foreign fishing vessel to engage
in fish processing in waters of a state if: 1) the foreign
nation under which such vessel is flagged is party to a GIFA or
treaty, within the meaning of 120l(h) of the MFCMA during the
time the vessel engages in such fish processing activities; and
(2) the owner or operator of the vessel applies to the
Governor of the concerned state for, and is granted, permission
for the vessel to engage in such processing. The Governor of
the state may not grant such permission if he ·determines that
processors within the State have adequate capacity and will
utilize such capacity, to process all of the United States
harvested fish from the fishery concerned that are landed in
that State.· 120 Thus, the purpose of the law is to provide
protectionist treatment for the domestic seafood processing
industry, while at the same time allowing foreign vessels
access to the internal waters of the states when that is
necessary to provide U.S. fishermen with enough processing
capacity to handle their catches.
The legislative
demonstrates a clear
preferences for the
internal waters:
history of the
intent to maintain
two sectors of the
law nevertheless
parallel, similar
industry even in
With respect to the determination of U.S. processing capa-
city and intent, it is not our intent that the decision of
a Governor be based solely on the price, or other contract
provisions, offered by foreign processors, nor that the
decision be used to intervene in labor disputes. In our
new, U.S. processors need not match or exceed the price,
or other contract provisions, being offered by the foreign
processors in order to demonstrate their capacity and
intent for a certain fishery. 121
The amendment also makes clear that foreign fishing
vessels which have been granted permission to conduct fish
processing activities within internal waters of a state are
required to comply with all applicable Federal and State laws
while operating within the internal waters of that State.122
The Department of Commerce opposed the request for a GIFA
for foreign processing vessels in state internal waters as
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being unduly burdensome, thus restricting the number of nations
whose vessels were eligible to engage in joint ventures with
u.s. fishermen. 123 Also no provision was made for review of
gUbernatorial decisions by the Regional Councils and the
Department of Commerce to ensure compatibility with the
regulatory programs for the FCZ, foreign processing vessels
would not have access to state waters outside the baseline~
thus, only the fishermen of those states with significant
internal waters would benefit from the improved market provided
by foreign processors. Also, there was no provision made for
the possibility that out-of-state processors would have
adequate capacity and would utilize such capacity if foreign
processing vessels were not allowed. 124 The Department of
Commerce believed the FCZ and all state waters should have
similar standards for granting access to foreign processing
vessels. The Governor should have the initial decision
regarding access to state waters, but that decision should be
reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce and Regional Councils to
ensure compatibility with regulatory decisions in the FCZ and
to ensure that out-of-state U.S. processors are not deprived of
their fish supply by decisions made in states nearby.
This amendment offers some loopholes for foreign
processors. First, if a Governor of one state approves foreign
processing in internal waters, but the Governor of an adjacent
state does not, the approval in the first state may cause a
shift in u.s. landings to the state in whose waters the foreign
processing vessel operates. Thus, foreign processing vessels
could "shop around" for the state with easiest access.
Secondly, as presently written, the definition of "internal
waters of a state" could open a loophole for foreign processing
vessels in state waters by permitting processing to occur
seaward of the 3-mile territorial sea off Florida (West Coast)
Puerto Rico, and Texas, where state boundaries extend seaward
of the territorial sea.
IV. Establishing a Joint Venture.
Joint venture arrangements are initially negotiated
between private business interests receipt of u.S. harvested
fish in the FCZ by a foreign processing vessel. These "over-
the-side sales" arrangements are contractual in nature, with
specific numbers of u.S. vessels delivering fish to a foreign
processing vessel for a certain price per pound. The foreign
partner determines how much fish it will receive based on
available resources. Once the venture is initially negotiated,
except for price, the owner or operator of a vessel registered
under the flag of a country with a GIFA applies for a foreign
fishing permit to receive the fish in the FCz.125 NMFS pro-
vides application forms to an applicant throuth a u.S. embassy
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or foreign embassy in Washington, D.C. The applicant must
answer All questions and then send the application to the
Department of State. A copy of the application and a fee of
U.S. $69 covers the costs of processing the permit application
and a surcharge for the Fishing Vessel and Gear Damage Fund.
Each application is reviewed by the public, and the
appropriate Regional Council, for up to 45 days. NMFS
considers comments by the public, the Coast Guard, the
Department of State, and Congress, then NMFS decides whether or
not to issue the permit. Before the permit is issued, an
official representative of the foreign government must accept,
on behalf of his government, ·conditions and restrictions·
attached to the permit. 126 When the conditions and
restrictions are accepted, NMFS sends the permit to the
Department of State and notifies the vessel's designated agent,
who must be located in the U.S. The Department of State then
sends the permit to the foreign government.
Permits ordinarily may not be switched to a different
vessel unless the original vessel is disabled or decommis-
sioned. A replacement may not be made to adjust to changes in
fishing strategy. Also, no permit is required of U.S. vessels
for the sale of fish to a foreign buyer. But, the U.S. vessel
owner must be sure under present law, that the foreign
processing vessel holds a permit to receive fish in the FCZ.
A permit may be revoked for ·egregious offenses· if the
offenses presented the risk of substantial harm to the affected
resources so that the activities should not be permitted to
continue. If the violations are found to be willful and
intentional, and a hearing has been held to determine whether
the vessel was in fact used in the commission of the act, this
is an adequate basis for revocation of a permit. 127
Other restrictions on the venture apply under other laws
of the U.S. For example, U.S.-caught fish processed onboard a
foreign flag vessel may not be landed in the U.S. unless
transshipped to a U.S. vessel for landing. 128 If the fish is
landed by a U.S. vessel in the U.S. it is not free of duty
unless the foreign flag processing vessel is under the
requisite control of an American master or owner. 129 If the
U.S.-caught fish are sorted on the foreign processing vessel
for landing it in the United States, and all or a fraction of
the fish are transferred back to a U.S. vessel the fish are
considered products of the American fisheries, for purposes of
classification or country or origin. 130
Examples of a number of joint ventures are included in the
Appendix in order to give the reader a short survey of the
types of joint ventures that have been proposed.
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v. Changes in Outlook
Joint ventures were seen as interim measures before full
utilization of fish in the 200-mile zone by the U.S. fishermen
and processors would take place. How quickly the U.S. industry
would develop was was still debatable. The technology to
process under-utilized species and the export markets for pro-
cessed goods that could compete in a world market supplied by a
number of countries were grossly inadequate. The AFPA did not
go far enough to encourage development of the fishing industry.
A central focus and further stimulation for development were
still needed. Joint ventures have provided much of this needed
focus and stimulation but the debate still rages as to what
place, if any, joint ventures have in the long-range future of
fisheries management. They have provided needed opportunities
for U.S. fishermen, especially on the West Coast, but proces-
sors on the East Coast continue their calls for a complete
phase-out of joint ventures immediately. It is clear that a
concise policy as to the role of joint ventures would have to
be developed.
The number of species exploited through joint ventures has
increased from the original proposal for hake and pollock. In
1982, joint ventures were established for Loligo squid, Illex
squid, silver hake, red hake, Pacific whiting, Pacific cod,
Alaska pollock, yellowfin sole, Atka mackerel, and Atlantic
mackerel. The U.S. catch going to foreign processors has
increased dramatically in the past few years, as shown in Table
1 below, representing a significant return for those involved.
In 1980, the joint venture catch was only 137.7 million pounds
valued at $8.4 million. In 1981, this amount rose to 307.8
million pounds, valued at $21 million. This represents over a
120% increase in amount of fish and a 150% increase in total
value. Then in 1982, the joint venture catch took another
gigantic leap up to 561.4 million pounds valued at $ 36.4
million. 131
TABLE 1
The growth in volume of fish purchased and value to U.S.
fishermen of joint ventures since 1980:
~ Volume value
1980 137.7 million Ibs. $ 8.4 million
1981 307.7 million Ibs. $21.0 million
1982 561.4 million lbs. $36.4 million
Therefore, in just three years the volume of joint venture
catch increased~ 300% with a value increase of 300%. One
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NMFS official stated that the number of joint venture
operations was increasing at a rate of 19% in the last few
years. 132 Although there is no way to compare increases in
volume with increases in effort expended without knowing the
number of vessels and crewmen involved in each operation, in
elementary terms of characterizing one new operation = one unit
of effort output, then volume of fish transferred has increased
at a rate of over 399% compared to an increase of only 39% in
effort. Even in this very generalized comparison, a 399:39
ratio is a very good return for a new type of industry only
five years old. Notwithstanding this somewhat imperfect
analysis, in the last three years u.s. fishermen obtained a
return of $65.8 million in sales of under-utilized species for
which there might not otherwise have been a market but for the
joint ventures. If current economic mUltipliers are applied to
this figure, it can readily be seen that the return to the
nation in benefits from these joint ventures is substantial.
This optimistic portrayal of such a new development would
portend enthusiastic vigor on the part of the u.s. fishing
industry in hopes for revitalization, but the controversies
over joint ventures continue. u.s. processors, of course,
staunchly oppose the establishment of joint ventures, while
many fishermen remain skeptical of any foreign investment at
all, still rallying behind the protectionist cry of wGet rid of
the foreigners from our waters. w
The Federal government has held off making policy
judgments about the long-term plans or assessments of joint
ventures. The National Advisory Committee on Oceans and
Atmosphere (NACOA) has advocated a wwait-and-see w attitude,
preferring to defer to the exigencies of experience. 133 And
NMFS, the agency most responsible for developing fishery
management policy has just recently developed a scheme to
follow in approving joint ventures. 134 Though rumors have
abounded in the past year that TALFF allocations are now only
going to those nations which agree to enter into joint
ventures that benefit the u.s. industry, thus making commitment
to enter a joint venture the major criteria in determining
foreign fishing rights, NMFS had not developed any kind of
monitoring system to govern the joint venture contractual
arrangements themselves, leaving this to the private parties in
each venture. All applications for joint ventures have been
approved when DAB exceeds DAP, sUbject to previously discussed
restrictions, and NMFS has not engaged in any long-term
planning or investigation of joint venture benefits to the u.s.
industry. The lack of monitoring led to the rise of abuses. A
U.S./Korean venture off the West Coast was one such example,
where the Koreans were not paying the fishermen for their
deliveries, and they were dramatically underreporting the
amount of catch delivered to Korean processing vessels. The
Japanese abused the system also. While promising the Federal
government an intent to enter into more joint ventures in
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return for an increased allocation, regotiations to set up
ventures never took place in certain instances, and the
Japanese notoriously, perhaps flagrantly, violated the
provisions and regulations of the MFCMA.
A. Developments On The East Coast
Joint ventures have operated primarily on the West Coast,
but in recent years have begun operating on the East Coast,
focusing on the squid fishery. As the potential for joint
venture activity developed on the East Coast, it became more
apparent that the statutory and regulatory language of the
MFCMA, as well as NMFS' governing policies, addressed joint
ventures strictly from West Coast perspectives. Thus, the New
England and the Mid-Atlantic Councils embarked upon an effort
to establish a policy guiding joint venture applications from
the perspective of East Coast fisheries.
The fishing industry on the East Coast is completely
different from the West Coast. These East Coast fisheries are
characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and small
firms. Fishing effort is way over-capitalized. There is
little vertical integration in this industry. Also, the
processing industry has had a much longer history on the East
Coast, handling a broader range of products, and is more
capable of delivering fish for export than processors on the
West Coast. Thus the debate between harvesters and processors
over joint ventures is more pronounced and politicized on the
East Coast.
The squid industry has been the focus of growing
controversy in recent years, especially with this year's
allocation of unprecedented quantities of Loligo for joint
ventures. 135 U.S. landings of squid have increased
tremendously, mainly as a result of the joint venture activity
and the concurrent interest of shoreside processors in
exploiting the large Western European squid market. U.S.
landings of squid on the East Coast for 1982 are summarized
below: 136
Mid-Atlantic
New England
Chesapeake region
7.9 million lbs.
6.9 million lbs.
3.3 million lbs.
-up 259% from 1981
-up 58% from 1981
-up 747% from 1981
This controversy has finally led NMFS to initiate the
formulation of a definitive policy concerning joint ventures.
However, the effort to develop criteria for governing joint
ventures has stemmed from the work of the New England Fisheries
Management Council (NEFMC) and the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries
Management Council (MAFMC).
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Under the MFCMA, the Regional Councils make
recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce on policy
concerning implementation of fishery management plans. Since
the Regional Councils develop the specifications and
assessments for MSY, OY, DAH, DAP, and thus, amounts available
for JVP, they began developing policy guidelines for approval
of joint venture applications. NEFMC and MAFMC worked closely
together to develop joint policy guidelines since the squid
fishery extends throughout the Northwest Atlantic.
Joint Guidelines were published in February of 1983. 137
The two Councils recognized that joint ventures offer a wide
range of benefits, but at the same time carry some potential
costs. They realized that both harvesters' and processors'
interests had to be weighed in formulating the guidelines, but
their ultimate concern was to end foreign harvesting in the
FCZ. With these factors in mind the Councils decided that
joint ventures would be allowed in fisheries where there is a
TALFF, and also in fisheries where domestic harvesting
capability and intent exceeds domestic processing capability
and intent. Also, the Councils agreed that joint ventures
should be authorized for specific amounts of fish since they
felt a guaranteed quantity would make a joint venture more
attractive. The Councils felt that joint ventures without
specified amounts would attract new, specialized vessels into
the fisheries, rather than provide an alternative to existing
vessels. The Councils wanted to guard against the creation of
a separate "joint venture industry.n It was also felt that
allocating specific amounts of fish would give NMFS greater
ability to monitor an individual venture's operations to make
sure it was in conformance with its permit.
Critics of these recommendations claimed specific
allocations were disastrous because the allocations precluded
someone else from getting the fish who may have been a more
efficient operator. They claimed this practice resulted in the
ownership of fish amounts - an anti-competitive practice
indeed. However, these recommendations were carried through by
NMFS.
If there were more joint venture applications for a
particular species than there were fish available, the
applications would be categorized and ranked according to which
ones provided the greatest involvement by the u.s. industry in
the entire process of utilizing the fish, i.e. harvesting,
processing and marketing. The categories were as follows:
Category A: The U.S. partner is the main participant in all
phases of the operation: harvesting, processing
and marketing.
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Category B: The U.S. partner is the main participant in the
harvesting and marketing of the product, with the
foreign partner the main participant in the
processing.
Category C: The U.S. partner is the main participant in the
harvesting and processing of the product, with the
foreign partner the main participant in the
marketing.
Category D: The u.S. partner harvests and sells over the side,
while the foreign partner is the main participant
in the processing and marketing.
Within each category the preferred joint ventures were those
that involved technical or scientific assistance to the u.S. or
purchases of additional under-utilized species products from
u.S. processors. Those that involved requests for additional
TALFF allocations or exemption from foreign fishing regulations
were considered less favorable. The idea was to help build up
the fisheries infrastructure, and the joint ventures which
would help accomplish this purpose were highly recommended. An
extensive amount of information on each joint venture,
including 1) information on the fisherY7 2) information of the
foreign partner7 3) information on the u.S. partner7 and 4)
information on the joint venture itself, was required before an
application would be evaluated. These informational require-
ments are listed in the Appendix.
Because requests for joint venture allocations in the
Illex squid fishery exceeded amounts available for JVP, NMFS
had to devise a means of ranking the applications it re-
ceived. 138 Applications were received by the Secretary of
State from seven foreign parties to receive u.S. harvested
Illex for the 1983-84 fishing year. The total amount requested
was 42,299 metric tons, however, only 22,199 metric tons were
available. 139 While NOAA considered issuing all the permits
and letting competitive market factors govern the resource,
NOAA Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, William Gordon,
decided to devisse criteria to rank the applications. Most
applicants had stated that a threshold quantity was required
before capital, time and effort would be committed to begin the
venture. Therefore NMFS developed a ranking system relying on
the recommendations of NEFMC/MAFMC in their joint guidelines}40
The ranking system, published as a nNotice of Intent to Approve
Joint Ventures", amended 59 C.F.R. § 611 governing foreign
fishing by establishing 23 objective criteria used in
evaluating the applications. These criteria are listed in the
Appendix.
The
Compliance
criteria covered three broad categories:
with Regulations/Business Agreements7 (B)
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(A)
Trade
Barriers and Market Development; and (C) U.S. Benefits and
Technology Transfer. Category A concerns past violations, if
any, of both the foreign and the U.S. partner in previous joint
ventures, as well as the total number of violations by the
foreign country's fleet. Category B follows the basic criteria
imposed by the AFPA for allocating TALFF to foreign nations
based on intent to lower trade barriers and increase U.S.
imports. Category C contains more comprehensive criteria
directed at the individual joint venture arrangements. These
criteria include: technology transfer provisions, training,
commitment to joint ventures, commitment of capital investment,
participation in U.S. fishery development, and the distribution
of harvesting/processing/marketing responsibilities between the
U.s. and the foreign party.
After a review of all the applications for Illex, they
were ranked according to the criteria. Five applications
scored high (joint ventures with Italy, Portugal, and Japan)
and were approved for specified amounts 141 ; three applications
(joint ventures with Spain and the USSR) scored much lower
and were denied any allocations. Permits were granted for 45
days following the issue date and subject to reauthorization
based on performance of the permit holder during the 45-day
period.
The Notice of Intent specified the procedures for applying
for Loligo joint ventures and stated that if Loligo requests
exceeded amounts available for JVP, the same 23 criteria would
be employed to rank the applications. 142 Presumably this
scheme of ranking will apply to other fisheries as the need
arises.
A few criticisms of the criteria can be discerned. While
admittedly "objective," the criteria are arguably sUbjective in
many instances. For example, if the U.S. partner or the foreign
partner are new to joint ventures, there is no "past
performance" to judge. Also, the "willingness to transfer
technology" and the "long-term commitment to joint ventures" are
sUbjective determinations. There is no definition of the
standards used to define "past performance". There is no way
of knowing the relative priorities of the criteria on the
ranking actually employed as a guideline for future experience.
This failure to define the standards and priorities more
clearly leads one to the conclusion that NMFS will still
exercise a great deal of discretion in approving joint venture
applications. 143
The development of specific criteria and guidelines upon
which applications would be evaluated did not lessen the heated
debate between harvesters and processors over the role of joint
ventures. This has been the biggest year for squid joint
ventures off the East Coast. An unusually large spring run
produced unprecedented shoreside landings. Processors
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originally told fisherman that they would handle all the squid
the boats could bring in. But with the glut of squid in May
and June, many boats were put on quotas and the price
plummeted. Prices started out at $ .38/lb. for unboxed squid,
but by the end of May had dropped to under $ .20/lb. 144 Yet
several major New England processors still claim that the
prospect of joint ventures hampered their ability to compete on
the Western European squid market, resulting in a huge buildup
of inventory which they could not sell. 145
The fishermen, meanwhile, say that joint ventures have
created a new and necessary outlet for their squid catches,
sparing them from the uncertainties and fluctuations of the
marketplace. The fishermen received Rguaranteed" prices of
$ .30-.40/lb. for squid sold at sea to foreign processors. One
fisherman suggested that domestic processors Rgot stuck" with a
large inventory of squid, after processing all they could
handle, because the quality of the squid they had produced
could not compare with the product that was sorted, packed and
frozen at sea. 146 One buyer and exporter in a joint venture
contended that there is at best a limited market for the U.S.
shores ide-processed product solely because of the quality.147
He says that foreign buyers opt for the best quality productJ
that quality is the bottom line. The opposing processors
believe that the argument about quality is ·overstated. R They
say that many buyers, particularly the Spanish, were reluctant
to buy from shoreside processors until they saw how their
Loligo joint ventures were going. 148
The fishermen have also argued that the U.S. processors
are not geared up to process or market the squid. They fear
that if foreign processing ships are turned away, squid prices
will plummet to the low levels of $ .15/lb seen before joint
ventures arose. They suggested that the competitive prices
shores ide processors are forced to pay for squid because of the
the joint ventures are the real issue, not competition in the
world marketplace.149
The processors counter that prices will remain high
because they have developed new markets and increased demand
for squid - both domestically and through export. However,
they say they cannot invest in new processing facilities until
the government sets a course to curb foreign competition in
U.S. waters - an argument the processors have been making since
before the preference amendment in 1978.
B. Recent Developments
Because of strong opposition by U.S. processors to joint
ventures and their requests that joint ventures be radically
curtailed or stopped altogether next year, NMFS conducted six
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meetings in the Northeast to generate industry input in the
matter. After hearing arguments from fishermen, dock owners
and processors affected by the joint venture squid fishery, it
appeared NMFS was ready to recommend a phasing out of both the
joint venture program and directed foreign fishing for squid in
u.s. waters. William Gordon remarked that his goal is to take
processing and exporting of U.S.-caught squid out of the hands
of foreigners, and that he wants the joint venture program
entirely phased out in the next two years. 150 While this
action may appease the shoreside processors, it would certainly
hurt the harvesters just when they are finally starting to get
ahead. Without the needed processing capability, as yet
undemonstrated by shores ide processors, the fishermen would
lose the valuable market that the joint ventures provide.
In a recent interview, Allen Peterson, former NMFS
Regional Director, suggests that eliminating foreigners from
our Fez may not be realistic. -I don't believe we're in a
position to totally utilize the squid resources today without
the help of foreign interests.- He views foreign fishing in
the Fez as a necessary tool: -Directed fishing for some of our
resources may be the necessary incentive or provide the
economic viability for certain kinds of joint ventures to take
place.- 151 He added that directed fishing is also needed as
leverage to open additional foreign markets under the u.s.
fish-and-chips policy. His arguments are persuasive, for
any abrupt action in eliminating joint ventures could spark
retaliatory trade bans on u.s. squid in the offended nations,
particularly Spain. Spain was glutted with an oversupply of
squid this year from many different countries, not just the
u.S. For this reason it is important to remember that foreign
partners willing to engage in joint ventures still need some
kind of incentive to participate, without which they could turn
to other sources of supply.
In March of this year a bill was introduced by Senator Ted
Stevens (R-AK) to close the 200-mile Fez to All foreign fishing
by 1988. 152 The bill was part of legislation to implement the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) proclaimed by President Reagan on
March 10, 1983. 153 While many believe the phase out called
for in the bill would help the u.S. industry, others are less
sure. Joint venture fishermen have shown particular concern
about the possibility that the bill could kill their
operations. A Stevens aide, when asked about this possibility,
stated that the hope is the loss of direct access to fish will
force foreign fleets to increase their reliance on joint
ventures. 154 Whether this would happen is debatable. But
the prospect of the bill being passed has already had a majo~
impact, in particularly trade negotiations with the Japanese.
Since the first joint ventures began to get underway in
1977, Japan has consistently lagged behind other nations in its
willingness to offer markets to the N. Pacific trawl fleet,
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either through direct purchases or through participation in
joint ventures. The Japanese were cautious about participating
in joint ventures because of the effect on their own fishing
industries. In 1982 the Japanese finally agreed to participate
in joint ventures after heavy pressure from Congress and the
White House and after the withholding of 19% of their TALFF in
waters of Alaska for the second half of the year. They
eventually purchased around 68,999 metric tons of Alaskan
groundfish from u.s. harvesters. In 1983, they increased their
purchases to 298,999 metric tons after the pressure from
Congress and the White House continued.
In November 1983, when trade negotiations resumed for the
1984 fishing year, the U.S. delegation carne armed with the
Stevens bill. Faced with the prospects of this phase-out, the
Japanese reluctantly agreed to buy more than 369,999 metric
tons of pollock from u.s. fishermen by the end of 1984 and
argued in principle of make direct purchases from u.s.
processors of up to 59,999 metric tons of combined species. 155
These purchases could be worth $44 million to the U.S.
industry next year. The Japanese have finally realized that
the size of their directed fishery will be directly linked to
their joint venture operations, a result that fisheries
promoters believed the AFPA could originally bring about.
Another development is the small but growing trend in
Alaska to attack the groundfish resources with
catcher/processors, either new boats or converted old vessels.
These new catcher/processors, known as "pocket processors,"
could provide a further stimulus to the U.S. industry and lead
the way to full utilization of the groundfish resources, albeit
many years away.156 On the East Coast, Lund's Fisheries in Cape
May, N.J., is finalizing plans to build a freezer/trawler that
should become the first totally American-built processing ship
operating on the East Coast.157 Lund's has been involved in
joint ventures since 1989 and has been putting their experience
to work in the design of this vessel. Because the joint
venture produces one thing that the U.S. shoreside processors
have not produced - a quality product - the development of
these catcher/processors will provide the means for the u.s.
processors to compete openly with the foreigners. 158
The Mid-Atlantic Council has recently revised its policy
guidelines for joint ventures and these revisions are expected
to be passed by the New England Council very soon. MAFMC
eliminated the four categories it previously used to rank the
joint venture applications, establishing instead criteria based
on benefits to be gained as a whole to the U.S. fishing indus-
try. 159 In their consideration of the relative merits ofjoint venture applications, the Council stated it will pay
particular attention to the following criteria:
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1. the amount of projected increase in u.s. involvement
in all phases of harvesting, processing, and marketing
due to the joint venture1
2. past performance and compliance with past joint ven-
ture commitments and permit conditions1
3. the benefits that the foreign nation offers the u.s.
fishing industry (includes extent to which the flag
nation of the foreign partner: purchases u.s.
processed products, competes with the u.s. fishing
industry in the world market, presents trade barriers
to u.s. processed fish products, and provides overall
assistance, including technology transfer to the u.s.
fishing industry) 1
4. long-term fishery commitments1
5. compliance with the MFCMA1 and
6. the extent to which the participants are identified and
committed to the joint venture.
The Council also changed some of the intormational requirements
for evaluation of applications, placing more emphasis on the
history of the foreign flag itself, rather than just the
history of the foreign joint venture partner. These revised
requirements are also included in the Appendix.
At the same
applicable entirely
enture applications.
time MAFMC adopted specific criteria
to the Illex, Loligo and mackerel joint
These criteria are as follows:
1. To receive a favorable recommendation from the
Council, Loligo joint ventures should contain the
provision that they will provide an increased us
domestic market for us processed Loligo or purchase
domestic processed Loligo. In setting priorities
between Loligo joint ventures, the joint venture with
the largest percentage of domestic processed Loligo
will receive the highest priority. Joint ventures
that purchase domestic processed Illex or mackerel in
addition to the higher amount of Loligo will receive
additional preference.
2. To the extent it is necessary to set
Illex or mackerel joint ventures,
priorities will be used:
priorities for
the following
a. the highest priority will be given to joint
ventures that provide an increased us domestic
market for us processed Loligo, Illex, or mackerel
or purchase domestic processed Loligo, Illex, or
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mackerel:
b. joint ventures involving a directed foreign
fishery will have the lowest priority unless they
have a greater share of the tonnage purchased from
US processors than joint ventures that do not
involve a directed foreign fishery: and
the value of US
the higher the
c. in all cases, the greater
processed product purchase,
priority ranking.
It is clear from these newly developed criteria that the
Council, instead of merely trying to solve short-term problems,
is starting to work toward the long-term goal of promoting full
utilization of resources by all segments of the industry.
One last development to occur that potentially could
affect joint ventures is the proposal for a Fisheries
Development Corporation coming out of the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee. 160 Though the bill has gone back to
the drawing board, 161 the bill raises speculations about the
ability of the Corporation to address policy concerns that are
stymied at NMFS, such as the role of foreign fishing in future
fisheries management. The ability to make long-range decisions
and plans that are needed in the industry might be effected
more easily by a quasi-governmental unit such as this
Corporation. Also, the Corporation, presumedly removed from
political pressures, might be better equipped to address the
debate between the harvesters and the processors to the
satisfaction of both. At this point in time, though, these
advantages are purely speculative.
VI. OVERVIEW OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF JOINT VENTURES
In considering the previous discussion presented in this
paper, a review of the costs and benefits (real or perceived)
of joint ventures is necessary before any recommendations can
be made regarding the sufficiency of existing policy on joint
ventures. NACOA has listed many benefits and costs in its 1982
Report on Fisheries which provides a general overview for this
purpose:
BENEFITS
1) Joint ventures have stimulated increased catches of
under-utilized species by domestic vessels:
2) catches by foreign vessels are being correspondingly
reduced1
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3) fishing opportunities have been provided for American
boat owners whose vessels would have otherwise been
idled most of the year and who would have suffered
severe financial loss;
4) new markets for U.S.-caught fish have been created,
which, for the first time, are providing u.S.
fishermen with opportunities to make foreign sales
comparable to those enjoyed by u.S. processors;
5) some species new to foreign markets have been
introduced into those markets. To the extent these
gain acceptance, opportunities for the sale of the
under-utilized fishery products by both U.S.
processors and fishermen will be enhanced;
6) deliveries are made at sea where processing can take
place soon after capture thereby improving quality,
and saving on time, fuel and ice;
7) costs are reduced because the system has eliminated
the need for long vessel runs to deliver catches to
shoreside processors;
8) American fishermen have gained improved fishing and
hauling techniques from experienced foreign fishermen
which will benefit the u.S. industry in long-term
development;
9) joint ventures have facilitated acquisition of better
trawling gear by established fishermen, resulting in
new trawl vessel construction, and expanded business
opportunities for support facilities such as yards,
gear and net supplies. l 62
Other benefits include:
10) increased data is collected on location of stocks;
11) advanced fleet management techniques are learned;
12) an alternative is provided for the high costs of
installing refrigeration equipment;
13) coordination among historically fragmented vessel
operators is enhanced;
14) needed investment funds are provided to all segments
of the industry;
15) economic analyses are incorporated in the
framework.
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MFCMA
COSTS:
1) u.S. processors have been precluded from the
opportunity to process and sell the u.S. caught fish;
2) expansion of U.S. processing facilities has been held
back in areas where joint ventures are operating;
3) u.S. shore labor loses job opportunities to foreign
ship labor where joint ventures are operating;
4) foreign at-sea processing could be terminated suddenly
by foreign processors, and this could leave domestic
vessels without markets;
5) joint ventures have tended to polarize and divide
fishing and processing segments of the industry;
6) only a relative small number of fishermen are able to
take advantage of joint ventures;
7) u.S. processors are at a competitive disadvantage with
foreign processors because of many domestic shore side
constraints not in effect on foreign vessels. 163
Many of these costs and benefits seem anomalous; in
effect, a chicken and egg debate can be discerned: First of
all, domestic and/or export markets must be available for the
processed fish and processors require steady and sufficient
supplies to operate efficiently; secondly, u.S. fishermen will
supply the fish for a decent price to garner some profits and
make endeavors worthwhile, but there will not be any markets
developed unless the fish are supplied in the first place. The
fishermen will not supply the fish unless the processors will
but the fish for a decent price, and the processor's will not
buy the fish, or be able to offer competitive prices unless
there are adequate markets in which to offer the processed
product. Then add to this circular argument the fact that
investment is needed to develop the markets, but lending insti-
tutions will not provide investment funds unless there are
established markets. At the same time much of the industry
remains fearful of accepting foreign investment.
Even with available export markets, the u.S. processors
will have to be competitive in these world markets, or buyers
will look to alternative sources of supply. The joint ventures
must be competitive in the international marketplace as well.
If all joint ventures were eliminated today, the u.S.
processors would still not be competitive in a global sense for
high volume/low value species.
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The long-term viability of the whole fishing industry must
be enhanced. Chuck Bundrant, president of Trident Seafoods
Corporation in Seattle, Washington, characterized joint
ventures as a ·band-aid solution· to industry's problems. Be
also said the ·overabundance of joint ventures has created a
fleet of fish sharecroppers with no long-term profitability
scheme and no development of infrastructure other than the
fishing vessels themselves. 164 However, Robert Swanson,
Vice President of Horizon Fish Company (another processor)
characterized joint ventures as essential "stepping stones" to
full domestic utilization of the vast resources. And that the
industry needs joint ventures, not only for the economic
viability of large U.S. stern-trawlers, but also so that
industry can learn firsthand of the sizes, behavior, and
concentrations of under-utilized species and the processing,
care, handling and marketing of the resultant product. 165
Though joint ventures provide a short-term adaptation to
development of underuti1ized fisheries, full domestic
utilization will not only require viable on-shore processors,
but also offshore processors as well. American fishermen may
not have to automatically adopt the technology of foreign
processing vessels, but they will have to devise ways of
overcoming the problems these vessels were designed to meet,
e.g. immediate processing to prevent spoilage and
decomposition.
The current push for changing U.S. shipping laws in order
to allow foreign-built, U.S.- owned processing vessels to land
fish in U.S. ports is a plausible alternative to joint ventures
if full domestic utilization is economically warranted.
Indeed, the great surplus of idle processing vessels on the
market today at rock-bottom or scrap prices indicates that
utilizing these vessels would be an economic solution in a
comparative cost sense, rather than building domestic vessels
at three, four, or maybe ten times the cost of a used vessel.
Of course, this solution would not be in the best interests of
the U.S. shipbuilding industry, but promoting one industry at
the expense of another is a judgmental balance that any
government must undertake. In terms of a110cative efficiency,
the industry with the greatest economic efficiency should be
supported, but in a political sense, this is rarely the case.
Cost/benefit analytical conclusions will rarely stifle
protectionist cries of politically popular constituents.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations for improving the regulation of joint
ventures are listed below under five qualitative categories:
(1) economic1 (2) politica11 (3) administrative1 (4)
1egis1ative1 and (5) social. Some of the recommendations made
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are general, some are very specific, both necessarily so. Some
of these suggestions are mutually exclusive, i.e. the
commitment to phase-out all foreign fishing and processing
entirely precludes encouragement of tying fishing rights to
joint venture commitments. Also, the commitment to economic
efficiency precludes most political considerations, and vice
versa. However, all the recommendations given constitute
factors and considerations that must be taken into account in
determining an overall management system. The recommendations
are as follows:
(1) ECONOMIC
a. More long-range planning for the u.S. fishing
industry should be conducted by NMFS.
b. Economic and allocative efficiency should be
incorporated into management decisions.
c. Incentives for foreign involvement
ventures should be instituted by
foreign fishing rights. l 66
in joint
maintaining
d. Flexibility should be maintained in joint venture
arrangements so that the business interests can
readily adapt to changing market conditions.
e. Foreign investment in U.S. fishing industry should
be encouraged.
f. Economic impediments to development should be
minimized.
g. Increases in per capita consumption of seafood
should be promoted.
h. Industry representatives should be sent to our
major overseas markets to collect more information
on the quality of product desired by consumers in
these markets.
i. Quality control programs should be more fully
developed by all shoreside processors.
(2) POLITICAL
a. Priorities should be determined regarding
promotion between different industries, and
different segments of an industry: i.e., fishing
industry v. ship building industry: harvesters v.
on-shore processors.
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b. The degree of protection given to the u.s. fishing
industry in trade matters should be more clearly
defined.
c. A commitment to export market expansion should be
maintained to increase the industry's
competitiveness in world trade matters.
d. Incentives for domestic investment in the u.s.
fishing industry should be provided.
e. The real goals regarding phase-out of foreign
fishing should be determined 167, and assurance
mechanisms instituted to see that these goals are
carried out.
f. Political disruptions in fisheries activities
should be minimized. 168
.
g. The goals in extracting benefits from foreign
partners in joint fishery ventures should be
determined.
(3) ADMINISTRATIVE
a. A monitoring system for evaluating the performance
of joint ventures on a periodical basis should be
instituted by NMFS or the Regional Councils and
the results of the investigations pUblished.
b. The criteria used in evaluating joint venture
performances should be clarified and published.
c. The consistency of joint venture arrangement
decisions with other oceanic and coastal programs,
e.g., coastal zone management, offshore pollution
control, and oil and gas leasing, should be
determined on a continuing basis.
d. The priority given to each of the criteria used in
ranking joint venture applications should be
clarified1 i.e., the relative importance of post
performance in joint ventures and commitment to
lower trade barriers.
e. Procedures for amending permits to reflect
increased allocations of joint venture processing
should be established and published.
f. Procedures for redistribution of joint venture
processing itself should be established and
published.
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g. Some system of
operators should
industry may take
ventures.
technology-sharing among u.S.
be established so the whole
advantage of gains made in joint
h. A more comprehensive
fisheries management
established.
framework
by NMFS
for national
should be
i. A quality inspection program should be instituted
by the FDA similar to agricultural, dairy and meat
inspection systems.
(4) LEGISLATIVE
a. Shipping and landing laws should be
Pub. L. No. 96-61 repealed, so as
purchase of foreign-built, but
processing vessels for use in coastal
amended and
to allow the
u.S. - flag,
fisheries.
b. Customs
amended
of fish
vessels
of trade
laws for
so as to
by u.S.
in joint
purposes
defining export sales should be
characterize over-the-side sales
fishermen to foreign processing
ventures as exports for balance
and statistical analysis. 169
c. The internal water processing amendment should be
modified to incorporate consistency of State
Governor-determined processor capacity with
Regional Council/NMFS-determined state capacity by
requiring Regional Council and/or NMFS review of
governors' determinations. 170
d. Flexible provisions in domestic loans to fishermen
or processors should be mandated through a
government-guarantee program.
(5) SOCIAL
a. Diversification of industry sectors should be
encouraged to take advantage of seasonal
variations in fisheries.
b. The goal of training u.S. labor through joint
ventures by the foreign partner should be elevated
to a higher stature.
c. Worker retraining programs should be established
in the event the U.S. fishing industry continues
to erode.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. has witnessed the rise of joint ventures in
recent years as an innovative method of garnering some of the
economic returns from our tremendous fishery resources. These
joint ventures potentially offer a wide range of benefits to
the entire fishing industry in the regions where they operate,
but there are also potential costs involved.
Both the foreign and domestic partners have benefitted by
these arrangements: the foreigners in maintaining access to
supplies, and U.S. fishermen in harvesting underutilized
species, developing new markets and new technology. And the
federal government has benefitted by extracting 'concessions
from the foreign partner as a condition of permit approval,
including lowered trade barriers, technology transfer, training
opportunities, and compliance with regulations, thereby
accomplishing a variety of policy objectives.
There is no question that joint ventures have stimulated
development in the industry. Without joint ventures, the huge
groundfish stocks off Alaska would remain as a directed
foreign fishery for we would not have the capacity to harvest
or process the stocks. New overseas markets have been
developed, such as for squid. And U.S. participants in joint
ventures have acquired the technology and experience to
establish their own catcher/processor vessels thereby moving
one more step toward full utilization of fishery resources by
the U.S. industry.
The debate between harvesters and processors is certain to
continue until all foreign fishing is completely phased out,
including joint ventures. The National Fisheries Institute has
called joint ventures and other direct sales by U.S. fishermen
to foreigners as short-sighted and detrimental to the growth of
the industry. But it seems joint ventures have provided the
only real growth to take place in the last few years. The
fishermen have progressed further than the processors in
developing their potential, and this has led to much of the
political arguments that have arisen. Patriotic cries of the
processors are heard, demanding that fishermen curb their joint
venture activities so that the processing industry may catch up
in development. In effect, the procesors say the fisherman
should accept lower prices as a subsidy to processors, thereby
benefiting the industry as a whole.
However, fishermen's efforts should not be stymied when
the processors have not demonstrated that the investment and
capital necessary to build up capacity will be committed.
Granted, some uncertainty over policy and the considerable
costs involved have contributed to discouraging the risk
capital necessary to get processors on their way, but
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investments will increase as economic viability during the
joint venture years is proven. Also, by perpetuating foreign
involvement in the fisheries, the joint ventures may also
continue dependence on foreign companies and allow foreign
fishermen to exploit markets which might otherwis~ turn toward
the u.s.
Joint ventures will eventually be phased out as the
investments increase, but in the meantime, foreign factory
ships should be allowed to continue buying and processing fish
and squid until the processors show they can handle all the
u.s. fishermen can catch - and at a fair price. For the
fishing vessels must keep working; without a continuous supply
of fish from the harvesters, the processors will surely be the
losers in the longrun.
The threshold problem that processors must face right now
is quality. They must set high standards for their products
and institute improved handling procedures. Al Guimond,
President of Stonington Seafoods - a participant in joint
ventures - requires the fishermen fishing for him to box the
squid they catch in specific ways on board the vessel before
bringing it in. The squid1s shape is properly maintained and
consequently, Guimond has no problem selling his product in the
overseas markets. 171 Quality may well be the bottom line in
expanding overseas markets, and this expansion is the
determinative factor in any formula to promote the fishing
industry.
The future of joint ventures is now in the hands of the
federal government, i.e. NMFS. Although NMFS has indicated a
willingness to phase-out joint ventures in the next two years,
this could prove disastrous to the fishermen who have staked
their livelihood on the species exploited through joint venture
arrangements. The joint ventures have proved to be
economically viable; the fishermen are satisfied; and markets
have been created. NMFS must undertake more long-term planning
in order to determine what is best in the long run. Management
decisions made now could have long-range effects; therefore,
goals and priorities must be further established to govern
these decisions - such as whether NMFS will continue to allowjoint ventures or not. Right now NMFS is not really settling
any problems - it is just trying to keep everyone happy.
The problem clearly remains that we do not know what is
best in the long run, and this inability hampers our decision-
making power. But the decision must be made as to the place
of joint ventures in the long-range future of fisheries
development. Some have predicted that the move to a trul~
domestic industry will be more evolutionary than revolutionary
- perhaps covering a decade or more - and that joint ventures
are simply one step in this evolutionary process. Whatever the
case, until the fishing industry is able to fully develop and
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compete in the world markets, joint ventures will provide the
means whereby at least a small share of the overseas market is
earned.
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APPENDIX I. Examples of Proposed Joint Ventures
(1) A joint venture was formed in 1976 between Bellingham
Cold storage of Seattle, Wash., and Sovrybflot, the
Soviet fisheries ministry, resulting in a new company
- Marine Resources Co. (MRC). U.S. vessels fish for
Pacific cod, herring, and pollock off the coasts of
Washington, Oregon and Alaksa. Vessel contracts are
with MRC itself and not with the Russians directly.
The fish delivered to the Soviet foreign processing
vessel are processed onboard, transferred back to the
Soviet Union and sold on the export market or
exchanged for higher-valued species which are then
returned to the U.S. for sale at the highest price
available. All profits go to the MRC and are then
divided - 5B/5B between Bellingham Cold Storage and
the Soviets. This joint venture has been extremely
successful and has been the role model for other joint
venture proposals.172
A lot of flexibility was lost after the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan since the Soviets could no
longer engage in a directed fishery ~ in joint
venture processing. Nonetheless the venture is still
profitable for the U.S. interests. It is the only
venture where the U.S. partner actually owns the
product and markets it, then splits the profits with
the Soviets.
(2) MRC applied for a permit for a US/USSR operation off
the Southern California coast with San Pedro fishermen
catching and processing anchovies, mackerel, and
squid. The Regional Council initially recommended
approval of the permit, but the permit was denied by
NMFS. No clear reason for denial was communicated,
but the permit application was filed shortly after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and
after President Carter announced all direct fishery
allocations to the Soviet Union were cut-off. 173
(3) Pan Alaska Fisheries entered an agreement with Taiyo
Fishery Co. of Japan for 7BBB metric tons of
unspecified bottom fish to turn into paste in the Gulf
of Alaska and Bering Sea areas.
(4) Universal Seafoods of Washington and Nippon Suisan
Kaisha, Ltd. of Japan entered an arrangement for 7BB
metric tons of pollock in order to get insight into
the Japanese surimi market.
(5) A US/USSR joint venture for shortbelly rockfish,
scheduled to begin in April 1981 was panned by the
Pacific Fishery Management Council. PFMC was under
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intense pressure from salmon trollers and other
sma11boat fishermen who feared the venture would cause
a great by-catch of Pacific salmon. MRC had plans to
have the shortbe11ies minced, frozen, and then sold on
the international market, reportedly in Africa.
(6) The Taiwanese got
donating $259,000
Pribi10f natives
vessels.
a directed fishery for pollock by
for the purchase of a vessel by
or for training aboard processing
(7) AMFISH, Ltd., a partnership between the Fisheries
Development Corporation of New York and a domestic
subsidiary of an Italian fishing firm, Amuroso, sought
revision of shipping laws to allow squid caught by the
Italian processing vessel to be landed in U.S. ports.
FDC and Amoruso planned to use the Italian vessel only
until such time as a U.S. processing vessel could be
built in the U.S., after which the new U.S. vessel
would take over operations of the Italian vessel. The
needed legislation was never passed and the joint
venture was cance11ed.174
(8) A joint venture between Korea Marine Industry
Development Corporation (KMIDC) and R.A. Davenny
Associates of Alaska was entered into for processing
approximately 49,909 metric tons of Alaska pollock.
Although this operation had a few problems at the
start, such as underreporting of delivery amounts by
the Koreans, and delayed payments to U.S. fishermen,
this venture has succeeded very well and continues
each year.
(9) East Germany was permitted to harvest 5090 metric tons
of Atlantic mackerel and may purchase an additional
5000 metric tons through a joint venture with Joint
Trawlers Ltd. (Gloucester, MA). Under the agreement,
approved by NOAA, the fish are taken from the U.S. FCZ
between Maine and North Carolina. None of the fish
harvested will be sold in the U.S. or Canada. East
Germany also has applied for an additional joint
venture from 1 April 1983 to 31 March 1984 in the same
fishery.
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II. New England/Mid-Atlantic CQuncil JQint Policy Guidelines-
February 1983
I. InfQrmatiQn Qn the Fishery
1. Area Qf usual domestic harvest; area JV is pro-
posed fQr.*
2. AmQunt of expQrt and impQrt Qf species, and
destinatiQns and Qrigins Qf each.*
3. Time JV is prQpQsed fQr.*
4. AmQunt applied fQr; minimum amQunt necessary tQ
engage in JV.*
5. Usual bycatch (type and percent), planned method
Qf dispQsitiQn.*
6. MSY, OY, DAH, DAP, TALFF, JVP, Reserve-Fishing
year, dates.
7. Time Qf usual dQmestic harvest.
8. Other JV's fQr same species.
9. AllQcatiQns frQm TALFF tQ cQuntry applying fQr JV.
II. InfQrmatiQn Qn the FQreign Partner
1. Vessels tQ be involved and violatiQn recQrd Qf
thQse vessels. Specify na~e, CQmpany Qr Qwner,
length, hold capacity 1n tons, processing
capacity, type of gear and other equipment.*
2. Whether participating vessel will also be involved
in a directed fishery under an allocation from
TALFF.*
3. Prior participation in joint ventures by the
foreign company of its vessels.*
4. Method of processing and final destination of
product.*
5. Is the foreign partner willing to extend the
venture if it is successful?*
6. Nation - violatiQn record by all vessels of the
nation.
7. Prior participation in joint ventures by the
foreign natiQn.
III. InformatiQn on the US Partner
1. Name and description of the firm*
2. RecQrd of any previous jQint ventures.*
3. Number, type and size of US
participating.*
4. Method of harvesting.*
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vessels
IV. Information on the joint venture
1. Will there be any purchase of US processed
product? Specify amount and form.*
2. Will there be any transfer of technology to the US
partner or US harvesters? Give details.*
3. Is there any scientific cooperation or
experimentation involved? Give details.*
4. How will the catch be transferred to the foreign
processing vessel?*
5. How will incidental catch be minimized and how
will it be handled?*
*Information must be supplied by applicant.
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III. JOINT VENTURE EyALUATION CRITERIA - APRIL 1983
A. Compliance with Regulations/Business Agreements:
1. Total violations by country's fleet (Northwestern
Atlantic).
2. Violations by vessels identified in joint
ventures.
3. Settlement record.
4. U.S. partner's past performance.
5. Past performance and U.S. partner's satisfaction.
B. Trade Barriers and Market Development:
6. Existing tariff and/or non-tariff barriers.
7. Indication of change, i.e. lowering of tariffs.
8. Import quotas, history and trend.
9. Purchase of U.S. processed product (amount, form).
10. Knowledge of final destination of product.
C. Technology Transfer and U.S. Benefits:
11. Willingness to transfer technology.
12. Description of technology to be transferred.
13. Need for technology transfer.
14. Training opportunities.
15. Long-term commitment to joint ventures.
16. Commitment of capital investment to U.S. partner
by foreign partner (to the extent known).
17. U.S. partner main participant in harvesting, pro-
cessing, marketing.
18. U.S. partner main participant in harvesting/mar-
keting, foreign partner main participant in pro-
cessing.
19. U.S. partner main participant in harvesting/pro-
cessing, foreign partner main participant in mar-
keting.
20. U.S. partner harvests and sells over the side,
foreign partner main participant in
processing/marketing.
21. Compatible with U.S. management strategy.
22. Direct participation in U.S. fishery development.
23. Amount of increased U.S. landings.
Source: 48 Fed. Reg. 18864, Notice of intent to approve joint
venture applications, April 26, 1983.
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IV. Mid-Atlantic Council Revised Policy Guidelines -
November 1983
Information Needed to Evaluate JV Applications
1. Information on the Foreign Partner
a. Vessels to be involved, including name, company or
owner, length, hold capacity in tons, processing
capacity, type of gear and other equipment, and
violation record of those vessels.
b. Whether participating vessel will also be involved
in a directed fishery for the species involved in
the JV.
c. Is the foreign partner willing to extend the JV if
it is successful (how long and under what
conditions)?
d. Documentation of request to NMFS for observer
coverage.
2. Information on the US Partner
a. Name and description of the firm: including
harvesting, processing, and freezing capacity, and
whether the facilities are owned or leased.
b. Name and historical business background, including
previous fishery experience, of the principal
officers of the firm.
c. Number, type, size, and NMFS permit number of US
vessels participating and type and extent of
commitment to JV.
d. Method of harvesting.
3. Information on the JV
a. Area JV is proposed for, specified by NMFS
Statistical Areas.
b. Time (beginning and ending months and years) JV is
proposed for.
c. Amount applied for, by species.
d. Allocation and catch of any previous JVs.
e. Planned disposition of bycatch, measures to
minimize and handle bycatch.
f. If there is to be any purchase of US processed
products specify: amount, form, species,
processor(s) involved, and timetable.
g. If there is to be any technology transfer to the
US partner or US harvesters, specify schedule and
type transfer (gear, quality improvement,
facility development, or processing).
h. If there is to be any scientific cooperation or
experimentation involved, specify schedule and
type of cooperation or experimentation.
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i. How will the catch be transferred to the foreign
processing vessel?
j. Method of processing and final destination of
product.
k. The amount of and schedule for projected increase
in US involvement in all phases of harvesting,
processing, and marketing due to the JV.
4. Information on the Flag Nation of the Foreign Partner
a. Purchases (imports) of US processed fishery
products by species for the two most recent
calendar years.
b. Import tariff rates for US fishery products.
c. Import quotas or other trade barriers relating to
the species involved in the JV.
d. Quantity of the species involved in the JV that
the nation harvested, imported, and exported for
each of the two most recent calendar years.
e. Nations to which the flag nation sold the species
involved in the JV and the quantities sold by
nation for each of the two most recent calendar
years.
The Council expects JV applicants to appear before the Council
as requested to explain responses to the above items and
possibly to answer additional questions.
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131. Fisheries of the United States, 1989, 1981, 1982.
132. Bi1ik interview, supra note 96.
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134. 48 Fed. Reg. 18864 (April 26, 1983) Notice of Intent to
approve joint venture applications (amending 59 C.F.R. § 611).
135. RSome Processors leery of joint ventures,· Nat'l Fish-
erman, Oct. 83 at 19.
136. NOAA, Draft, Summary of Major Trends Affecting u.S.
Marine Fisheries, July 21, 1983.
137. New England and Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Councils, Guidelines for Council Consideration of Joint Venture
Applications, Feb. 7, 1983.
138. The initial annual specifications for I1lex and Lo1igo
are as follows:
Species OY DAH DAP JVP Reserve TALFF
I11ex 39,999 27,199 5,999 22,199 1,459 1,459
Lo1igo 44,999 22,999 19,399 11,799 11,999 11,999
~ 48 Fed. Reg. 18818 (1983)148 Fed. Reg. 33992 (1983).
In 1982 U.S. fishermen landed 3432 mt of Il1ex squid for
shores ide processing (a six-fold increase over 1981 landings)
and 3779 mt of Loligo squid for shoreside processing (a 39%
increase from 1981). Although the Mid-Atlantic Council
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recommended an increase in DAP for Illex to 19,999 mt, NMFS
determined that this increase was based on unsubstantiated
reports of domestic landings. Therefore, NMFS selected S,999
mt, the same as in the last three years. Shoreside processors
of LoligQ estimated they could utilize up to 22,999 mt in 1983,
mostly in export. However, the growth in the export market is
dependent upon 2 factors:
1. A reduced offshore foreign catch of Loligo, and
2. The amount of Loligo allowed for joint ventures.
To create a balance between joint ventures and concerns of
the shoreside processors, the Secretary specified an increased
DAP of 19,399 mt and a JVP of 11,799 mt. This increase would
allow for a three-fold growth for shores ide processors. Id.
139. ~ 48 Fed. Reg. 18818 (April 26, 1983) (Atlantic
Mackerel, Squid and Butterfish Fisheries1 Preliminary initial
specifications).
149. ~ 48 Fed. Reg. 18864 (April 26, 1983) (Notice of
intent to approve joint venture applications).
141. The amounts approved by NMFS for Illex joint ventures
were as follows:
International Seafood Trading Corp.!Italy
Lunds Fisheries, Inc./Portugal
Scan Ocean/Portugal
Joint Trawlers, Ltd./Portugal
Lunds Fisheries, Inc./Japan
Sea Harvest, Inc./Spain (2 applications)
Scan Ocean/USSR
5959 mt
8599 mt
4259 mt
2559 mt
859 mt
NONE
NONE
48 Fed. Reg. 18864 (1983). It is clear that under the new
criteria politics will continue to playa role in deciding
whose application will be approved. For instance, the Scan
Ocean/USSR proposal was ranked third overall by the New England
Council, but the Mid-Atlantic Council recommended against an
allocation because this Council felt political problems between
the two countries would prevent the venture from ever coming
off. Obviously, MAFMC had some indication from NMFS and DOS
that the venture would not be approved, and ultimately, it was
not approved. ~ "Squid, Politics, Joint Ventures,"
Commercial Fisheries News, May 1983 at 1.
142. The OY, DAP and JVP for Loligo were specified as
44,999 mt, 19,399 mt and 11,799 mt, respectively, supra note
138. And NOAA learned that during the April I-June 19, 1983
Loligo run, 6599 mt were landed by domestic vessels for
shoreside processing. This amount exceeded the entire annual
Loligo landings of 3779 mt for 1982, demonstrating that joint
ventures have not significantly affected shoreside processors.
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ventures have not significantly affected shoreside processors.
~ 48 Fed. Reg. 33001 (July 20, 1983).
143. Off. of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Establishing a
200-Mile Fisheries Zone (1977). Discretionary power is not
limited to NMFS. In an August press release, MAFMC announced
guidelines for changing the OY of squid, mackerel, and
butterfish in order to allow for adjustments due to seasonal
availability of squid, changes in fishing patterns or practices
of U.S. fishermen fishing for more economically valuable
species of fish: increases in TALFF to reward foreign nations
providing markets for U.S. exporters, joint venture operations
and changes to approved joint ventures, and for "other
benefits." Presumably this ability to adjust the OYs will
endow the councils and NMFS with more "flexibility" in
responding to unforeseen circumstances in management of these
fisheries. But by taking away the certainty in
specifications, the changes render business planning very
difficult for longer-term arrangements.
The amendment grants the Regional Director of NMFS, in
consultation with the Council, the authority to adjust squid
OYs based upon certain biological and economical factors. The
economic factors to be applied are as follows:
and
harvesters
processors
squid-producing
U.S.
by
U.S.
to
to
potential
revenues
ventures):
revenues
export1. total world
countries:
2. total world import demand by squid-consuming nations:
3. U.S. export potential based on expected U.S. harvests,
expected U.S. consumption, relative prices, exchange
rates, and foreign trade barriers:
4. increased/decreased revenues to the U.S. from foreign
fees:
5. increased/decreased
(with/without joint
6. increased/decreased
exporters:
7. increases/decreases in U.S. harvesting productivity due
to decreases/increases in foreign harvests:
8. increases/decreases in U.S. processing productivity: and
9. potential impact of increased/decreased TALFF on foreign
purchases of U.S. products and services and U.S.-caught
fish, changes in trade barriers, technology transfer, and
other considerations.
~ Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council, Press Release
25 August 1983.
144. "Tempers short, lots at stake in Loligo squid glut,"
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